I am primarily interested in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language. I am particularly interested in the metaphysics of material objects, space, time, fundamentality, modality and meaning. You will find my CV along with a list of published or soon to be published papers below.
Papers:
“Creature Features: Character Production and Failed Explanations in Fiction, Folklore, and Theorizing” (with Chris Tillman) Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming)
Fictional realism is the view that creatures of fiction exist. Mythical realism is the view that creatures of myth and mistaken theories exist. Call the combined view “Ecumenical Realism.” We critically evaluate three arguments for Ecumenical Realism and argue they are unsound because fictional storytelling differs from mistaken theorizing in important ways. We think these considerations support a more conservative view, “Sectarian Realism,” which results from subtracting “creatures of mistaken theorizing” from Ecumenical Realism. We close by considering an important challenge to Sectarian Realism involving immigrants in fiction.
“Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World” Philosopies: Time Travel 2nd Edition (Forthcoming)
I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario.
“A Special Composition Puzzle” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2023)
Suppose that Bits compose Whole. An answer to the Special Composition Question should entail the conditions, C, such that the fact that Bits are C grounds that there is a y such that Bits compose y. But existential facts are grounded in their instances. Hence Bits compose Whole also grounds that there is a y such that Bits compose y. Thus, if there is a correct answer to the Special Composition Question, we will have overdetermining grounds for the fact that there is a y such that Bits compose y. But this particular overdetermination is prima facie unacceptable.
“Plenitudinous Russellianism” Routledge Handbook of Propositions (2023)
According to the Standard Russellian Theory of Propositions, (1) propositions are complex objects made up of their constituents; (2) each constituent that helps to make up a proposition plays a particular role in that proposition; and (3) given any propositional constituents and an assignment of propositional roles to those constituents, there is at most one proposition composed of just those constituents playing those assigned roles. According to Plenitudinous Russellianism, claim (3) is mistaken. Plenitudinous Russellianism has a ready-made response to Frege’s Puzzle. In short, the proposition that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens can differ in cognitive value from the proposition that Mark Twain is Mark Twain because those propositions are numerical distinct even though they are made of the same constituents playing the same roles.
“On the Explanatory Demands of the Special Composition Question” Synthese (2021)
The Special Composition Question may be formulated as follows: for any xs whatsoever, what are the metaphysically necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in virtue of which there is a y such that those xs compose y? But what is the scope of the sought after explanation? Should an answer merely explain compositional facts, or should it explain certain ontological facts as well? On one natural reading, the question seeks an explanation of both the compositional facts and the ontological; the question seeks to explain how composite objects exist; how there is a y such that the xs compose y. But it turns out that some answers to the Special Composition Question presuppose those ontological facts rather than explain those ontological facts. In this paper, I will indicate what I take to be the different explanatory demands met by the representative answers. I will argue that the wide scope explanatory demands can’t be satisfied. I will also show that this result has bearing on the current debate about composition.
“The Limits of Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude (and its Conceptual Neighbors)” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2020)
Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, any property that could be had essentially by something or other is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because it is instantiated; any essentializable property is essentialized iff and because it is instantiated. In this paper, I develop a partial non-modal characterization of “essentializable” and show it cannot be transformed into a full characterization. There are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any full characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, these obstacles threaten other views in the conceptual neighborhood such as Counterpart Theoretic Plenitude and Conceptualist Plenitude.
“Advanced D&D (Dan Korman and Debunking)” (With Chris Tillman) Analysis (2020)
In Korman (2014) and Korman (2015), Daniel Z. Korman advances a novel response to a debunking argument for the conclusion that we aren’t justified in believing the deliverances of our experiences when it comes to ordinary object beliefs. This paper critically assesses Korman’s preferred solution and offers an alternative.
“Necessity of Origins and Multi-Origin Art” (With Chris Tillman) Inquiry: an International Journal of Philosophy (2018)
The Necessity of Origins is the thesis that, necessarily, if a material object wholly originates from some particular material, then it could not have wholly originated from any significantly non-overlapping material. Several philosophers have argued for this thesis using as a premise a principle that we call ‘Single Origin Necessity’. However, we argue that Single Origin Necessity is false. So any arguments for The Necessity of Origins that rely on Single Origin Necessity are unsound. We also argue that the Necessity of Origins itself is false. Our arguments rely on a thesis in the ontology of art that we find plausible: Multi-Work Materialism. It is the thesis that works of art that have multiple concrete manifestations are co-located with those manifestations.
“Conceivability and Possibility” in Graham Oppy (ed.) Ontological Arguments (2018)
Some people might be tempted by modal ontological arguments from the possibility that God exists to the conclusion that God in fact exists. They might also be tempted to support the claim that possibly God exists by appealing to the conceivability of God’s existence. In this chapter, I introduce three constraints on an adequate theory of philosophical conceivability. I then consider and develop both imagination-based accounts of conceivability and conceptual coherence-based accounts of conceivability. Finally, I return to the modal ontological argument and consider whether the premise that possibly God exists can be supported by some conceiving.
“Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special Composition Question” Erkenntnis (2017)
Strong Composition as Identity is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence is mistaken. Although I am sympathetic to this objection, in this paper, I present two responses on behalf of the theorist. I also show that once the defender of accepts one of these two responses, that defender will be able to answer The Special Composition Question.
“The problem of empty names and Russellian Plenitude” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2016)
‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.
“Two Thoughts on ‘A Tale of Two Parts’” Res Philosophica (2014)
In “A Tale of Two Simples,” I presented an argument against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples that relied on the possibility of extended atomic regions of space. Andrew Jaeger has presented a parody of one part of my argument for a clearly absurd conclusion. In this short paper, I defend my argument by showing that there is a significant disanalogy between my support for a key premise in my argument and Jaeger’s support for the corresponding premise in his parody argument. Also, in opposition to my previous position, I present a case against the possibility of extended atomic regions of space.
“Unnecessary Existents” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2014)
Timothy Williamson has argued for the radical conclusion that everything necessarily exists. In this paper, I assume that the conclusion of Williamson’s argument is more incredible than the denial of his premises. Under the assumption that Williamson is mistaken, I argue for the claim that there are some structured propositions which have constituents that might not have existed. If those constituents had not existed, then the propositions would have had an unfilled role; they would have been gappy. This gappy propositions view allows for a plausible response to Williamson’s argument. Additionally, a slight variant of the gappy propositions view allows for plausible defense of Linguistic Ersatzism from the problem of contingent non-existents (also known as the problem of aliens).
“What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway)” Philosophical Studies (2013)
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on the possibility of time travel. At the end of the paper, I formulate a more sophisticated version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a certain fine grained notion of actions. I then explain how this new kind of counterexample can be augmented to show that even the more sophisticated principle is false.
“Strong Composition as Identity and Simplicity” Erkenntnis (2013)
The General Composition Question asks “what are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any xs and any y must satisfy in order for it to be true that those xs compose that y?” Although this question has received little attention, there is an interesting and theoretically fruitful answer. Namely, Strong Composition as Identity (SCAI): Necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are identical to y. SCAI is theoretically fruitful because if it is true, then there is an answers to one of the most difficult and intractable questions of mereology (The Simple Question). In this paper, I introduce the Identity Account of Simplicity and argue that if SCAI is true then this Identity Account of Simplicity is as well. I consider an objection to The Identity Account of Simplicity. Ultimately, I find this objection unsuccessful.
“Semantic Stipulation and Knowledge De Re” (With Chris Tillman) Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (2012)
Kripke’s discussion in Naming and Necessity strongly suggests that we can come to have de re knowledge simply by reflecting on our acts of semantic stipulation. For example, if we say “Let ‘L’ name the location of the tallest tree in Washington State” then we can come to know that the tallest tree in Washington is at L simply by reflecting on how we introduced the name. We believe that we can have de re thoughts about the location of the tallest tree in Washington as a result of our semantic sipulation. However those thoughts are nothing to worry about because they are informationally isolated.
“All Things Must Pass Away” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2012)
Some people believe that there are some things that are all things. That is, there are some things that are such that any thing whatsoever is among them. However, this is inconsistent with certain liberal metaphysical views. For example, it is inconsistent with the view that for any things, there is a proposition about just those things. In this paper, I discuss the ramifications of this inconsistency.
“Ways of Being” Philosophy Compass (2012)
Ontological pluralism, the view that there is more than one way of being, is enjoying a revival in contemporary metaphysics. it seems that there are numbers, fictional characters, impossible things, and holes. But, these things don’t exist in the same sense as cars and human beings. If they exist or have being at all, then they have different ways of being. What are ways of being? Why should be believe in them and what should we believe about them? This short essay provides an overview of the recent revival of ways of being and explores some of the surrounding issues.
Typos: Page 913, the two instances of “ways of believing” should be “ways of being”
“Musical Materialism and the Inheritance Problem” (with Chris Tillman) Analysis (2012)
Musical Materialism is the thesis that musical works are more like material objects than abstract objects. On one way of taking this view, musical works are either fusions of their concrete manifestations (performances) or coincide with those manifestations. Some believe that if Musical Materialism is true, then musical works inherit various problematic features from their concrete manifestations. We disagree.
“A Tale of Two Simples” Philosophical Studies (2010)
An extended simple is an extended object that has no proper parts. Can an extended simple have intrinsic variation across its surface? In this paper, I argue that extended simples that occupy extended regions that have no proper subregions cannot have intrinsic variation across their surfaces. Moreover, if those simples cannot have intrinsic variations, then neither can extended simple that occupy regions that do have proper subregions.
“Holes as Regions of Spacetime” (with Andrew Wake and Greg Fowler) The Monist (July 2007)
We discuss the view that a hole is identical to the region of spacetime at which it is located. This view is more parsimonious than the view that holes are sui generus entities located at those regions surrounded by their hosts and it is more plausible than the view that there are no holes. We defend the spacetime view from several objections.
“Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being”, Philo (Spring/Summer 2006)
Is it possible for there to be an omniscient being? Not if unrestricted composition is true. If unrestricted composition is true, then there are just too many things to know.
Book Reviews:
“The Fragmentation of Being, by Kris McDaniel” Mind (2022)
“Could There Have Been Nothing? Against Metaphysical Nihilism, by Geraldine Coggins” Mind (2016)
“Naming, Necessity, and More: Explorations in the Philosophical Work of Saul Kripke, edited by Jonathan Berg” Analysis (2016)
“Introduction to Ontology by Nikk Effingham” Teaching Philosophy (2014)
This is a review of Nikk Effingham’s textbook from a pedagogical perspective.
“Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions by Jodi Azzouni” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2011).
Works in Progress
Coming Soon.